

KLEEMPOROS

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OF THE ANCIENT ACCOUNTS of the first Illyrian war two are worthy of serious consideration, those of Appian and Polybius.¹ The others are valuable for the light they may throw upon these two.² It must be emphasised at the outset that Appian and Polybius not only differ here but contradict one another on a number of points. In Polybius, the Illyrian king Agron died by the end of 231 (or so Polybius has been taken to imply) and was succeeded by his wife Teuta sometime before the dispatch of the Roman embassy in 230.³ In Appian's version, Agron was still on the throne when the Issaian embassy to Rome was dispatched; it was after

¹Appian, *Illyr.* 7.17–22; Polyb. 2.2–8. Rome's third-century dealings with Illyria have been examined most recently by K.-E. Petzold in an article that does much to bring out the value of Appian's account of the Illyrian wars ("Rom und Illyrien," *Historia* 20 [1971] 199–223), but his discussion of the outbreak of the first war is brief (pp. 217–220) and leaves much unsaid. The same is true of N. G. L. Hammond, "Illyris, Rome, and Macedon in 229–205 B.C.," *JRS* 58 (1968) 1–21. The latest detailed treatment of the background of the first war is that of G. Walser ("Die Ursachen des ersten römisch-illyrischen Krieges," *Historia* 2 [1953–1954] 308–318), who argued to good advantage in support of Appian and against Polybius. It seems to me, and I hope it will become clear from the present discussion, that the case for believing Appian can and must be made a great deal stronger. In the notes below the aforementioned works will be referred to in abbreviated form, as will the following: E. Badian, "Notes on Roman policy in Illyria," in his *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford 1964) 1–33 (orig. *PBSR* 1952); G. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3.1² (Florence 1967; page numbers given in parentheses are those of the first edition); M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au III^e siècle avant J.-C.* (Paris 1921); F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 1 (Oxford 1957); J. J. Wilkes, *Dalmatia* (London 1969); G. Zippel, *Die römische Herrschaft in Illyrien bis auf Augustus* (Leipzig 1877).

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²For the Latin sources, see below, 123–124. The version in Dio, at least that part of it which deals with the events leading up to the war (12, fr. 49.1–5; cf. Zon. 8.19.3–4), is no more than a conflation of what appears in Appian and Polybius, with some unhappy additions. The result is a blend unlike and inferior to both the chief ingredients.

³The Roman embassy, as indicated by Appian and, most clearly, by Polybius, belongs to the year immediately preceding the Roman campaign, which was fought in calendar and consular 229. For the date see M. Holleaux, *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* 4 (Paris 1952) 1–25 (orig. *REG* 1930), the decisive rejection of Beloch's chronology (followed by Walser, without mention of this article by Holleaux), which put the campaign in 228.

this and before the Roman expedition that he died.⁴ He was succeeded, according to Appian, by his small son Pinnes, for whom Teuta, wife of Agron and stepmother of Pinnes, acted as regent.⁵ In Polybius, the Roman embassy was brought about by the complaints of Italian merchants about the activity of Illyrian pirates, particularly after the brutal treatment of some Italian traders at the time of the Illyrian attack upon Phoinike (230) and the corresponding increase of protests to the Senate.⁶ In Appian, the immediate occasion of the embassy was the appeal to Rome by the Greeks of Issa, who were somehow threatened by King Agron.⁷ Similarly, while Polybius states that the Roman envoys were sent to investigate the Italian complaints, Appian has them sent, along with the Issaian ambassadors to Rome, in order to discover what were Agron's complaints against Issa. Next, and perhaps most important, in Polybius the brothers Coruncanius have an interview with Queen Teuta that is described in some detail. According to Appian, the Roman ambassadors did not arrive at their destination but were set upon beforehand by some Illyrian *lemboi*, at which time occurred the murders of two ambassadors, one Roman and one Issaian. Briefly, Appian has an appeal of which there is not a word in Polybius, and Polybius has an interview which on Appian's account not only did not take place but could not have done so.⁸ Both agree that the murder of the Roman ambassador led directly to the Roman declaration of war. At issue here is the question as to which version of the events leading up to this is to be preferred.

Most who have dealt with the outbreak of the first Illyrian war have based their accounts upon Polybius and have rejected, in varying degrees of detail, the version in Appian.⁹ A notable exception is De Sanctis. He

⁴On the date of Agron's death, see the chronological note below, 133–134, where a different interpretation of Polybius' chronology is proposed. The decision on this chronological question does not materially affect the assessment of the relative value of the two accounts.

⁵Polybius fails to indicate that Teuta acted as regent on behalf of Pinnes (cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1. 156). Of Pinnes Polybius shows, in fact, no knowledge whatever.

⁶The Phoinike incident is to be dated to August/September 230 on the chronology suggested below (133–134), to mid-summer 230 on the standard view (cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1. 156–158).

⁷If, as suggested below (133–134), Agron died around July 230, his threat against Issa may belong to June of that year or even a little later (Agron did not himself participate in the Medeon campaign). Appian's narrative requires only that he was alive when the Issaian envoys left for Rome. The Roman embassy will thus have set off in, perhaps, July/August.

⁸The belief of Zippel (48), that Appian's report that the envoys were murdered on their way to Illyria originated in a misreading by Appian of his source, does not square with the presence of the Issaian envoy, and is to be rejected.

⁹So, for example, B. Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chäronea* 2 (Gotha 1899) 281 with n. 5; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte* 4.1 (Berlin-Leipzig 1925) 664 with n. 1; E. Badian, *SGRH* 1, n. 3; cf. Walbank,

saw no reason to reject the appeal from Issa (Appian), but alongside it he accepted the interview of the brothers Coruncanus with Queen Teuta (Polybius). In view of the contradictions outlined above, and especially the last of them, a collocation of this sort does not seem possible.¹⁰

Appian's account may be criticised as being overly brief,¹¹ but few would attempt to deny that the version in Polybius presents difficulties

Commentary 1. 153. A fundamental argument in support of the primacy of Polybius is of course that of Holleaux (*Rome, la Grèce*, 23, n. 6, and 98, n. 2), whose statement of the case seems to me to betray a weakness characteristic of the position he adopts. He treats the accounts of Appian and Dio as being effectively the same (see esp. 23, n. 6; at 98, n. 2 *ad fin.* Appian is not even mentioned), and yet the internal difficulties catalogued in order to discredit that version (98, n. 2) are found only in Dio. Difficulties they are, but they are not in Appian and have nothing to do with his quite separate report. The appeal from Issa itself, ascribed thus without distinction to Appian and Dio, is rejected (23, n. 6) (a) because Polybius states that Issa was not received into the Roman trust until the end of the expedition in 229 (Holleaux' "non seulement [Polybe] est muet sur la démarche qu'auraient faite à Rome les Isséens" is presumably not intended as an argument bearing any weight by itself), and (b) because Issa, although under siege for some time (almost a full year, Polybius seems to imply: 2.8.5, 11.11) was the last place to be relieved by the Romans. The first of these rests upon the assumption that by their appeal the Issaians quite surrendered themselves and their fate to the Senate, which is neither stated in nor a necessary inference from Appian's story. It assumes also that the Issaians were sufficiently versed in the complexities of Roman practice to have empowered their envoys at the time of their dispatch to perform a *deditio in fidem*. This is a dangerous assumption. In 191 the Aitolian ambassadors were so unclear as to the meaning of this gesture that, having made it and discovered its force, they had then to unmake it and (with Roman permission) refer the decision to the assembled League (Polyb. 20.9–10.12; Livy 36.27–28). If, as seems quite likely, the Roman and Issaian ambassadors in Appian were on their way to Issa to certify this step (as well as to enable the Romans to learn more about the situation), then the *deditio* cannot have been effected, for the ambassadors never got there. It would, then, have been after their relief that the Issaians actually entered the Roman trust, something like a year after the original (and for Issa not very helpful) appeal for aid. The second reason depends upon another assumption (or misunderstanding), namely that Appian maintains that the war was undertaken primarily on behalf of the inhabitants of Issa. He does not. Perhaps more seriously, Holleaux' second reason also discounts the fact that the decision of the consul Fulvius to begin at Corcyra seems to have been prompted, not long before his crossing, by the arrival of Demetrios' promises (Polyb. 2.11.2–4; cf. Appian, *Ill.* 7.19). The Roman campaign proceeded thence northward until, with the relief of Issa, it ended. Once Corcyra was offered, Issa could, and evidently did, wait.

¹⁰De Sanctis 286–287 (295–296). Petzold (220) reckons Appian's version of the death of the ambassadors more likely than that in Polybius, and Walser (311) rejects Polybius' account of the interview as improbable. If Appian's account is to be followed, probability ceases to be an issue: the interview cannot have taken place.

¹¹This is most evident in his exceedingly compressed account of the campaign itself. The four lines which he devotes to the military activity after Corcyra (contrast Polyb. 2.11.6–16, in terms of length and detail) should probably not be taken as anything more than the briefest of summaries and should accordingly not be taken as being chronologically precise. I do not, for example, suppose that he meant in 7.20 that the Atintani

of its own. It was suggested earlier that there may, in fact, be no real chronological imprecision in Polybius, but his unawareness of Pinnes remains to indicate a loose grasp of Illyrian affairs. Of a different order is the strain put upon our credulity by the description of the encounter of the Roman envoys with the Illyrian queen. The contrast between righteous Romans and impetuous barbarian queen is drawn so strikingly that the whole scene threatens to defy belief altogether, and it is no surprise that those who have questioned Polybius' account have focussed upon this aspect of it.¹² It is not easy to know how much weight should be given to the charge of incredibility. Yet there is force in Walbank's observation: "Certainly the retort of the younger Coruncanius . . . has the appearance of a *post eventum* invention . . .," and Walbank is also right to insist that Polybius' account here must be read as a whole.¹³ Any difficulties that are raised by the story of the interview must be compounded severalfold by the fact that Polybius requires his readers to believe that the Illyrians dispatched by Teuta were supposed to stop the returning Roman ship and kill just the one Roman ambassador, the free-speaker.¹⁴ Such action on the part of Teuta seems more than a little

defected to Rome after the relief of Issa (according to Polyb. 2.11.8–12 their defection came between the reliefs of Epidamnos and Issa) but suspect rather that Issa and Epidamnos are given together because they were both sieges. By the same token I doubt that the wording should be pressed to the point of requiring Appian to be saying that Issa was relieved before Epidamnos. In fact, the double mention of Epidamnos at the end of 7.19 may raise a different sort of problem: οἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταύταις Ἐπίδαμνον ἐς φιλιαν ὑπηγάγοντο, καὶ τοῖς Ἰσίοις καὶ Ἐπιδάμνιοις πολιορκουμένοις ὑπὸ Ἰλλυριῶν ἐς ἐπικουρίαν ἔπλεον. In Polybius (2.11.8) the Romans took in Apollonia (did not relieve it from a siege) before they sailed to the relief of Epidamnos. Later on Appian states (8.22) that the Romans freed Corcyra and Apollonia. The latter city appears here in Appian out of the blue, which makes it look as if it has somehow fallen out of the preceding account. I would suggest as a possibility that it was Apollonia that the Romans ἐς φιλιαν ὑπηγάγοντο (7.19; this describes what the Romans in Polybius did to Apollonia; how they could have done it to Epidamnos before going there is far from clear), and that Ἐπίδαμνον is there by mistake (perhaps the error of a copyist whose eye had caught, instead of Ἀπολλωνίαν, the start of Ἐπιδάμνιοις eight words ahead). Whatever be thought of this, the case of Apollonia may serve further to indicate that Appian's brief account of the campaign should not be pressed too hard (note also that the fact that in Appian the Romans freed Apollonia must mean that this city has been wrongly omitted from or has fallen out of the list of places and people claimed as subject to Rome in 7.21).

¹²The best statement is that of A. Bauer, "Die Anfänge österreichischer Geschichte," *AEM* 18 (1895) 128–150 at p. 144; cf. Petzold and Walser, *loc. cit.* (above, note 10).

¹³*Commentary* 1.159.

¹⁴2.8.12. Polybius, to be sure, does not state explicitly that only the one Roman was murdered, but his account at 2.8.12–13 certainly suggests that Teuta's Illyrians did what they were told. Moreover, multiple murdered ambassadors are found only in later accounts that are characterised by various and extensive exaggeration (cf. Dio 12, fr. 49.3 and see below, 123–124). In a somewhat different category is Pliny, who purports to

contrived for narrative effect; besides serving to make her personally responsible for what on Appian's account is an unfortunate accident, the picture of adventure at sea that this calls forth is indeed an amazing one. The question about Polybius may also be approached in a more general way. To insist that he is on the whole a good and conscientious historian is one thing. To claim *a priori* that he is preferable on the first Illyrian war is something quite else. It is first of all to lose sight of his own remarks at 4.2.2–3, where he explains that his account of events before 220 is, in his mind, on a footing different from (and less good than) that of his history after that date. It is also to forget that his report of the second Illyrian war, which suppresses entirely the rôle of one of the consuls of 219, is undeniably deficient.¹⁵

The task of assessing the relative value of the two accounts would be easier were it possible to know with certainty who their respective sources were. This whole question has been obscured by the fact that the conflict between the two has been framed as a conflict between Polybius on the one hand and "the annalists" or "the annalistic version" on the other, coupled with the equation between "annalistic" and "unreliable" (perhaps even "fabricated") and the assumption that Polybius is, at the least, preferable to anything annalistic.¹⁶ This type of analysis, when it involves such sharp distinctions and implications as these, is unlikely to be helpful,¹⁷ and in the present case it is, as will be seen, particularly

name (*HN* 34.24) two Romans killed by Queen Teuta: P. Iunius and Ti. Coruncanius. The former is mentioned in no other account. The latter is misnamed, at least to judge from Polybius, who calls the Coruncanii Lucius and Gaius. These Coruncanii may have been Ti.f., sons of the consul of 280 who died about 243 (the suggestion in Polybius that one of them, ὁ νεώτερος, was in fact a youngish man does not make this especially likely) or of an homonymous son of his (this could well make them too young). On the other hand, the names in Polybius (only he and Pliny give *praenomina* here) may be wrong (he or a copyist of his did bungle the *praenomen* of L. Postumius, *cos.* 229: 2.11.1; cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1.161). On balance, it seems more likely that Pliny has produced a wrongly named Coruncanius. As for Iunius, neither Appian nor Livy (on whom see below, n. 22) nor, I think, Polybius allow another Roman victim, and it seems best to believe that Pliny has gone astray here, too, just as he does a few lines later in the same section when he attributes to Cn. Octavius the famous diplomatic *coup de bâton* of C. Popillius Laenas.

¹⁵3.16.7, 18–19; cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1.325.

¹⁶The same effect is achieved by setting "earlier annalists" off against "later annalists." Thus Beloch (*loc. cit.* [above, n. 9]) saw Polybius' account as derived from "the oldest annalists," and probably Fabius Pictor, and all the other versions dependent upon "later annalists." Similarly, Niese, (*loc. cit.* [above, n. 9]) set Polybius apart from the rest (from Appian and Dio in particular), whose reports he took to have been founded upon "die jüngere römische Erzählung." Cf. also Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 23 n. 6. Walbank describes Appian as "well-informed on Illyria, but contaminated by annalistic inventions" (*Commentary* 1.153; so Badian, *SGRH* 1, n. 3; neither discusses this in detail).

¹⁷The validity of this kind of emotive use of the term "annalistic" has been justly and

inappropriate. Two sets of questions arise here, one dealing with Polybius, the other with Appian and "the annalists" (late, later, or whatever) with whom he has been linked.

If certainty is available in neither case, there is still room for some more or less positive statements about the sources of Polybius' account. 2.2–6 and 9–10 do not involve the Romans and would seem to be founded upon an earlier Greek account that was unfriendly toward the Aitolians.¹⁸ This last and the mention of Margos at 10.5 suggest an Achaian source and particularly Aratos' *Memoirs*.¹⁹ The report of the Roman embassy (2.8) is clearly of Roman origin and is probably derived, as most have thought, from Fabius Pictor.²⁰ If this is the case, it may be useful to recall what Polybius has to say about Fabius elsewhere. In dealing with the first Punic war Polybius was glad to have before him the differing versions of Fabius and Philinos. Neither, he felt, was an intentional liar, but each was nonetheless led into error by his bias for one side or the other (1.14–15). In his discussion of the outbreak of the second Punic war Polybius was a good deal more severe with Fabius. To such of his readers as might chance upon the books of Fabius he issued there a strong warning that goes well beyond the good-natured reproach in Book 1 and that gives a good indication of how, in Polybius' view, Fabius, although a senator and a contemporary of the events, sometimes wrote history (3.9.1–5). There is no very obvious reason why, if Fabius was weak on outbreaks in 264 and 218, he should have been any better in between. Nor is it at all clear why Polybius' account, if it is in fact the Fabian version, should exercise any special claim upon our credence, and this quite independently of the fact that some central elements of the story are far from admitting of easy belief.

As to the identity of Appian's source or sources anything approaching certainty or even likelihood is unattainable. Safe to say only that it is not the same as Polybius', that if Polybius probably followed Fabius Pictor Appian with equal probability did not.²¹ The question of Appian's rela-

effectively questioned by J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *JRS* 44 (1954) 30–42; cf. *eund.*, *CQ* n.s. 3 (1953) 158–164, esp. 162–164.

¹⁸Cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1.153.

¹⁹Cf. M. Gelzer, *Kleine Schriften* 3 (Wiesbaden 1964) 205 (orig. *Gnomon* 1957).

²⁰Cf. Walbank, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 18). On Fabius-Polybius here, see especially Gelzer, *Kl. Schr.* 3.66–71 (orig. *Hermes* 1933). On the possible use by Polybius of the report rendered in Greece by the Roman ambassadors in 228, see below, 129–131. It should be noted that the break between 2.7 and 2.8 is a sharp one, reflecting an abrupt change in the viewpoint of the narrative from Greek to Roman. From 2.8 to 2.9 the change is the other way and no less marked. Polybius has here joined two quite separate strands.

²¹As to the range of previous historians consulted by Appian, the *Illyrika* may perhaps be compared with the *Makedonika* (I have not read J. Dobias, *Studie k Appianově knize Illyrské* [Prague 1930]). For that work P. Meloni (*Il valore storico e le fonti del libro*

tion to "the annalists," however, does admit of more comment. One would expect to find Roman tradition reflected in later Latin writers, and indeed something of the kind does seem to emerge from those of them who treat of the first Illyrian war in any detail, namely Florus and Orosius.²² They both speak of murdered Roman ambassadors (in the plural), and in both (Orosius especially) the war has grown into a savage and wide-ranging affair. Neither exaggeration is shared by Appian. Florus is by far the most colourful (as well as the most lengthy), and it is he alone of the Latin writers who preserves the story of the interview. None of their accounts has much in common with that of Appian, although Florus makes a good deal of the fact, as does Polybius, that a woman was involved. None of the Latin writers has so much as a word about an embassy from Issa. A comparison of the relevant accounts would therefore seem to suggest that there is no good reason to connect Appian here with the Roman annalists. On present evidence it were more reasonable to trace the annalistic version reflected in Florus back through Livy to Fabius Pictor. It evidently suffered from accretion as time went on, but it is of this tradition, in its early stages to be sure, that Polybius will have partaken. His account has far more in common with anything that might for concrete reasons be ascribed to annalists than does Appian's.²³ The fact that the latter has an appeal from Issa ought never to have suggested that he is giving a pro-Roman "annalistic" story or to have been taken to imply fabrication or anything like it. Historical invocations of Roman aid are plentiful enough. There cannot be much question that Thourioi and

macedonico di Appiano [Rome 1955]) argued that Appian used, besides Polybius and an annalist, a Greek historian of the middle (roughly) of the second century B.C. Gelzer, reviewing Meloni, preferred to believe that Appian worked not directly from this contemporary (or nearly contemporary) Greek source but by way of a later compilation (*Kl. Schr.* 3.280–285 [orig. *Bibl. Orientalis* 1957]), but Meloni seems on balance to have the better case (cf. J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *JRS* 46 [1956] 199–201). Certainly such Greek sources were about and were used later, as Pausanias 7.7–16 shows (on Pausanias' source here, Greek but not Polybius, see C. Wachsmuth, *Leipziger Studien* 10 [1887] 269–298); the similarity between Appian *Mak.* 2 and Paus. 7.8.9 is appropriately noted by Balsdon (*loc. cit.*). Appian had access to, and seems not to have been averse to using, good information not found in Polybius or Livy. (Cf. also below, n. 23.)

²²Florus 1.21; Orosius 4.13.1–2. Eutropius records the war at 3.2 but has nothing on the embassy. The single sentence in the *periocha* of Livy 20 is quite non-committal: *bellum Illyriis propter unum ex legatis, qui ad eos missi erant, occisum indictum, subactique in deditionem venerunt.*

²³It is possible that there were other versions of the story preserved in the annalistic tradition, but of such of these as there may have been it must be said that we are quite without evidence. It is therefore equally possible that Appian's account derives from such a branch, long withered away without a trace, of the annalistic tradition. The point I should wish to stress here is that Appian's account looks quite unlike any of the surviving accounts that may with any confidence be reckoned as derived in some way from the Roman annalists. (On Dio, cf. above, n. 2.)

the Mamertines before and Saguntum soon after the first Illyrian war did appeal to Rome, and Appian does not, in any case, claim that Rome went to war on behalf of Issa.²⁴

That Issa plays an important part in Appian's account is undeniable. This ought not, however, to be seen as a difficulty but rather as a reasonable part of a reasonable picture. One recalls that a colony on Issa had been founded by Syracuse.²⁵ In 230 Rome and Hieron's Syracuse were on thoroughly good terms with one another, and the adventurous might suggest that this had something to do with the fact that the Issaians appealed to Rome. More concrete evidence of connexions between Issa and Italy is to be found in the early existence of an active trade route between Issa and southern Italy. This would, moreover, seem to involve Issa alone of the Illyrian islands.²⁶ The Issaians were also active in the commerce with the Dalmatian hinterland to the north and east.²⁷ Possibly of interest in this connexion are some coin hoards from Yugoslavia, particularly one found at Mazin (about 45 miles northeast of Zadar) in 1896, which contains a substantial amount of early Roman bronze.²⁸ The hoards were buried late, perhaps early in the first century B.C., and consist of bronze that was valued more because it was bronze

²⁴For the suggestion that Appian says they did, see Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce* 23, n. 6; Hammond, *JRS* 1968, 5, n. 16; cf. above, n. 9. Against taking the Issaian appeal as an indication of annalistic invention, see Petzold 218.

²⁵There has been some question as to whether the colony founded by Dionysios was at Issa or Lissos. In Diodorus' report of the foundation the mss vary between *Ἰσσαν* (15.13.4) and *Ἰσσην*, *Ἰσσην* (15.14.2). The only other evidence for the settlement states outright that there was a Syracusan colony on Issa (Skymnos, *Peripl.* 413f. [as in C. Müller, *Geographici Graeci Minores* (Paris 1882)]). Holleaux was sure that Issa, and not Lissos, was the place (*CAH* 7.826 [= *Etudes* 4.80] n. 1; similarly De Sanctis 286 [295]), but others have opted for Lissos (cf. M. Fluss, *RE Suppl.* 5 [1931], s.v. Issa, 346–347 and, most recently, Wilkes, *Dalmatia* 9–10, who, however, only just opts for Lissos and admits that Issa may even be more likely) or have doubted that a full resolution is possible (cf. R. L. Beaumont, *JHS* 56 [1936] 202–203). The literary evidence seems to me to require that Issa be taken as the site of Dionysios' foundation, and there is corroboration of this in the fact that the fourth century coinage of Issa was under clear and strong Syracusan influence (see J. Brunšmid, *Die Inschriften und Münzen der griechischen Städte Dalmatiens* [Vienna 1898] 38).

²⁶Fluss, *RE Suppl.* 5. 347–348; cf. Petzold 219 and esp. Walser 316.

²⁷K. Patsch, *Die Lika in römischer Zeit* (Vienna 1900) 27. Also active there were Pharos and, especially, Corcyra and Epidamnos.

²⁸The Mazin hoard is no. 142 in M. H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coin Hoards* (London 1969); cf. S. P. Noe, *A Bibliography of Greek Coin Hoards*² (New York 1937) no. 666. The Roman bronze therein dates from the beginning of the third century to about the middle of the second (compare Crawford's Tables I and III with the contents of the hoard, no. 142). Roman bronze of the early years of the denarius system appears in two other Yugoslavian hoards, both found further inland, one at Gračac in 1925 (no. 145 in Crawford) and the other in 1887 at Vrankamen Berg (near Bosnanska Krupa; no. 146 in Crawford; cf. Noe, *op. cit.*, no. 1169).

than because it was Rome's (or anyone else's) coinage.²⁹ Yet the Mazin hoard does contain *aes rude* that belongs beyond doubt to the early and middle third century. That the bronze was exported for its value as metal and not as state coinage seems clear, but there does remain the question as to just when it crossed the Adriatic. It may all have crossed long after the period here under consideration, and the fact that it appears alongside coins of the late second century might seem to suggest this.³⁰ On the other hand, it has been suggested of some of the Roman bars from Mazin that they were exported as metal not long after being made in the early to middle third century.³¹ Tending in the same direction is the view that there was in early operation a system of trade whereby products from the hinterland of Dalmatia were sold to merchants at the harbours through the agency of the Liburnians who inhabited the area.³² Supporting this, perhaps, is the likelihood that a period during which transient merchants traded at coastal depots went before the development of regular settlements such as the one at Narona.³³ Liburnian pirates are reported to have been causing trouble round 300 B.C. (Livy 10.2.4), and if this is right there must have been something about for them to bother. It does not, on the whole, seem possible to answer with much confidence the question as to where this early Roman bronze lay from the time it ceased to be in active circulation to the time when it was buried in Yugoslavia. Nor is it known who carried it across or what they received in exchange for it.³⁴ Whatever the answers to these questions, the area was evidently one in which the traders of Issa were themselves active. From such early indications as there are it is at least clear that the rôle of Issa in Appian's account poses no historical problems, and one may note at the same time Issa's later

²⁹The question about bronze in the area where these hoards were found is whether it was destined for use in a bronze foundry or kept for its value as bullion: see R. Thomsen, *Early Roman Coinage* 3 (Copenhagen 1961) 210; cf. 3. 203, n. 416. On this question as it relates to the Vrankamen find in particular, see C. Truhelka, *Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen aus Bosnien und der Hercegovina* 1 (1893) 185.

³⁰This indication would be more compelling if the bronze was in fact headed for a foundry, substantially less so if it formed instead a cache of valuable bullion. See n. 29 for the choices: no decision seems possible.

³¹So A. Blanchet, *Revue Numismatique* 4^e sér., 5 (1901) 292, based upon the conclusions of M. Bahrfeldt (*Der Münzfund von Mazin*).

³²See H. Willers, *Num. Zeitschr.* 36 (1904) 5, n. 5.

³³For the Roman settlement at Narona, an established one by the middle of the second century B.C., see J. Hatzfeld, *Les trafiquants italiens dans l'orient hellénique* (Paris 1919) 22; cf., briefly, Wilkes, *Dalmatia* 35. Further to the south, in about 263, the Aitolians granted proxeny to a Roman who comes out as Δευκίῳ Δευκίου Ὀλκαίῳ[ι]: *IG* 9².1, 17 A, line 51.

³⁴Amber has been suggested (by J. Brunšmid: see Blanchet, *op. cit.* [above, n. 31] 291) but is no more than a possibility.

rôle as loyal and active ally of Rome from early in the second Macedonian war onward.³⁵

One might at this stage be inclined to say that while Polybius' version offers at least one obstacle to belief (the interview and Teuta's murder plot taken together), that of Appian does not. One last but far from unimportant point about the latter's account remains to be made. Both Appian and Polybius name the murdered Roman ambassador, Coruncanus. Appian alone names the Issaian envoy who suffered the same fate, Kleemporos. The detail is a nice one, especially as the name is rare.³⁶ Known to me are four Kleemporoi, of whom two are not Illyrian (a physician mentioned by the elder Pliny and a third-century B.C. Athenian) and two are.³⁷ Both the Illyrians, as it happens, are Issaian ambassadors involved with Rome, the one in Appian and the other in an inscription of 56 B.C. found at Salona, that deals with an embassy to Julius Caesar on the subject of Romano-Issaian relations. The ambassadors there are named as follows (lines 6-9): $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta\epsilon[\nu]|\sigma\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\omega\nu -^{\pm} - \Pi\alpha\mu\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon \Pi[\alpha\mu]|\phi\acute{\iota}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \text{Κλεε}\mu[\acute{\rho}\omicron\rho\omicron\upsilon] \tau\omicron\upsilon \text{Τιμα}\sigma[\acute{\iota}\omega]|\nu\omicron\varsigma \nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon \langle\kappa\alpha\iota\rangle \Phi\iota\lambda\omicron\xi\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon [\tau\omicron\upsilon] \Delta\iota\omicron\nu\nu\sigma\acute{\iota}\omicron\upsilon$.³⁸ The appearance here of the name Kleemporos (no other restoration is possible) is worthy of note. In the original publication of the whole inscription Kubitschek remarked the identity of names here and in Appian but chose to draw no conclusions therefrom; since then the epigraphical Kleemporos has not been the subject of special comment.³⁹ Yet the appearance of this later namesake provides what seems to me to be very strong evidence for the existence of Appian's Issaian ambassador.

³⁵On this see especially Zippel 92-93.

³⁶Elsewhere also Appian shows a predilection for giving detail in the form of a name. One of the few details in his rather summary (perhaps because fragmentary) account of the treaty between Philip and Hannibal (*Mak.* 1.2-3) is the name of Philip's envoy, Xenophanes; for Xenophanes see Polyb. 7.9.1 and Livy 23.33.6, 34.5.

³⁷Pliny *HN* 22.90, 34.159; *Syll.*³ 486.6 for the Athenian. Both Illyrians and the doctor are in H. Krahe, *Lexikon altillyrischer Personennamen* (Heidelberg 1929) s.n. "Cleemporos." The Athenian is not there, and others, if any there be, I have not found.

³⁸For this inscription see now R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East* (Baltimore 1969) 139-142, no. 24 ("Senatus consultum de Issaeis?"). The text given here is from Sherk's composite (p. 140), save that he prints for the gap in line 7 the restoration proposed by Rendić-Miočević, ΤΡΑΓΥΤΙ[ΝΩΝ] (Rendić-Miočević did not actually dot the iota, but Sherk does; it should be dotted at least). This is a possibility (Tragurion being a colony of Issa on the mainland), but from such photographs as have been published it is by no means clear that these letters and traces are there, and the restoration seems rather long for the amount of space involved.

³⁹W. Kubitschek, "Eine Inschrift aus Salona," *Jahrbuch für Altertumskunde* 1 (1907) 78-85 (p. 83 on the names). For subsequent treatments, see the bibliography given by Sherk (*op. cit.* [above, note 38] 139; the document is discussed briefly by Wilkes, *Dalmatia* 38-39, cf. 220; cf. also J. and L. Robert, *Bulletin épigraphique* 1953, no. 122).

Any attempt to explain away Appian's Klemporos will likely require such excessive subtlety as to be altogether unacceptable.⁴⁰

Appian's report is thus recommended both by its details and by the fact that it is more plausible than that of Polybius. An embassy from the Greeks of Issa provided the immediate occasion for the Roman embassy of 230, and the murder at sea of one of these ambassadors led directly to the Roman declaration of war. It is still, however, worth asking what, if any, rôle is to be assigned to the Italian traders mentioned by Polybius and their complaints to the Senate. There is no reason to deny that such traders may have fared ill at the hands of Illyrian pirates or that they voiced their displeasure at Rome. Appian's account does not rule this out in the same way that it necessarily excludes the tale of the interview, and the treaty at the end of the war, common to Appian and Polybius, may suggest that piracy was involved in one way or another.⁴¹ Indeed piracy and Italian complaints may have been in the air at much the same time as the appeal from Issa, for on the chronology suggested earlier the Issaian embassy and the Phoinike episode will not have been separated by a great deal of time, the former belonging perhaps to June 230 and the latter to August or so.⁴² It is, however, necessary to reject the view that the Italian complaints were exclusively, primarily, or even largely responsible for the Roman decision to send the embassy.

This discussion cannot reasonably be concluded without at least some attempt to explain why Polybius wrote the account he did, for it now appears that what he has given us is not as true to the facts as it might have been. The most economical answer to this question is that proposed by Gelzer, according to whom Polybius was wholly dependent upon Fabius Pictor, who made no mention of the embassy from Issa, concerned as he was to refute the notion that the Romans meddled in affairs that did not concern them.⁴³ To this perhaps not wholly satisfying answer more positive considerations may be added. Polybius characterised the Lissos clause of the treaty with Teuta as *ἡ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας*

⁴⁰Those who urge fabrication might assume, for example, that his source was a member of Caesar's staff in 56 or perhaps someone with an interest in Dalmatian epigraphy. It should be noted that Appian does not seem to have known of the later embassy, although he does record one of about the same time from the Liburnians to Caesar (*Ill.* 12).

⁴¹For the treaty: Appian *Ill.* 7.21; Polyb. 2.12.3. Both report the Lissos clause (assuming that *ἡσσόν* in Appian is correctly emended to *Δίσσον*; in 7.17, etc. *ἡσσός* is clearly Issa: cf. apparatus in Viereck-Roos; the names of these two places were frequently confused: cf. above, n. 25).

⁴²See above, nn. 6, 7.

⁴³*Kl. Schr.* 3.67–68: "Es ist klar, dass Fabius gerade dieses erste Eingreifen in die hellenische Welt mit grosser Sorgfalt behandelte und mit aller Entschiedenheit den Vorwurf bekämpfte, dass sich die Römer in Verhältnisse einmischten, die sie nichts angingen" (68).

διέτεινε, which Hammond has described as “a piece of Roman ‘philhellenic’ propaganda which was anachronistic in 228.”⁴⁴ Such concern for “the Greeks” was vigorously displayed by the Romans from at least 200 on (Pol. 16.27.2 for the earliest secure manifestation of this policy; cf. 16.34.3). If, as seems likely but is by no means sure, Fabius was writing just about 200,⁴⁵ one might have expected to find him explaining to Greek readers of his Greek annals that this concern for the Greeks had been behind the first military intervention of Rome in the Greek world. Such a line would be especially appropriate at a time when the Romans, having earned a reputation for savage treatment of Greeks during the first Macedonian war, were searching for Greek allies on the eve of the renewal of their conflict with Philip. A fair bit of explaining needed to be done. It seems, moreover, highly unlikely that Fabius would have wanted to make much of a Greek appeal to Rome for help that brought the appellants no help at all during an almost year-long siege. Even if these considerations about Fabius are right, a question about Polybius remains, for one has still to explain why he followed Fabius so readily and, apparently, uncritically.⁴⁶ It is possible that Polybius sought no further information after reading Fabius’ account, but to acquit him of the charge of having merely retailed his predecessor’s story is to lay him open to the more serious one of dishonesty, for if he did know of the Issaian embassy he has suppressed something that is clearly significant. At this juncture one begins to enter the realm of speculation, but there does seem to be available an explanation capable of providing at least a partial answer to either of these charges. It is a variation on what is in fact

⁴⁴JRS 1968, 7, n. 24.

⁴⁵Fabius’ history was likely published before 193/2 (see G. V. Sumner, *Latomus* 31 [1972] 470–471), but one does not know how much before. For the suggestion that it belongs to the years following soon after the defeat of Hannibal, see E. Badian in *Latin Historians* (ed. T. A. Dorey, London 1966) 4; cf. 3 and A. Momigliano, *Terzo Contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico* 1 (Rome 1966) 65 (orig. *Rend. Accad. Lincei* 1960).

⁴⁶In what follows it will be clear that I am myself inclined to believe, for the reasons just given, that the appeal from Issa played no independent part in Fabius’ account. I should, however, wish to allow the possibility that it did figure there in a very minor way, perhaps as a brief appendage to the complaints about Illyrian piracy, one to which was allotted no separate importance at all. If this were the case, the considerations here offered about Polybius would serve to explain why he has taken the suppression of Issa one step further (see esp. 130–131); and cf. perhaps Polyb. 2.8.3: *τότε καὶ πλείονων ἐπελθόντων ἐπὶ τὴν σύγκλητον*). Since Fabius is quite lost, one must, strictly, allow the possibility that his account did make a good deal of Issa and that Polybius has altogether changed this. Against this are the arguments just advanced in the text and what was said earlier about the surviving Roman tradition of the first war (above, 123–124), and Polyb. 1.13.6–7 (for which see below) is far from suggesting that Polybius did anything of the kind; but I doubt that anything said here could explain wholesale rewriting by Polybius, if such, unlikely though it seems, is what he did.

an old hypothesis about the sources of Polybius' history of the first Illyrian war. Some time ago Bauer suggested that Polybius' account of the Roman embassy (2.8) was based not upon Fabius but upon the report rendered by the Roman ambassadors who visited the Achaians, among others, in 228.⁴⁷ One must avoid any sort of schematism here. There are not the grounds to begin to assert that 2.11–12 are from Fabius while 2.8 is from the ambassadors' report, nor is such an analysis even very likely. Rehearsal of a fictitious interview can have formed no part of the diplomatic explanations of 228. Yet the fact remains that there were ambassadors who did say something, and it would not be altogether surprising if some of the Achaian politicians of the time (e.g., Aratos) took note of their remarks (if they were not officially recorded) and if Polybius himself later acquired some notion of what had transpired at the meeting. He certainly suggests as much when he states of the Roman ambassadors in 228: *πρῶτον μὲν ἀπελογίσαντο τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως, ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις τὰ πεπραγμένα διεξήλθον καὶ τὰς συνθήκας παρανέγνωσαν ὥς ἐπεποίηντο πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς* (2.12.4). A fanciful reconstruction of part of their "apology" might run as follows: "The Illyrian pirates were a menace to all who would sail the Adriatic in peace. This you know from your own experience and from that of your fellow Greeks, while we ourselves have received from our friends and allies in Italy not a few complaints about pirate attacks. Moreover, as you have no doubt heard, one of our own ambassadors, while sailing upon a purely diplomatic mission, was foully murdered by these barbarians. To such provocation we could not but respond with force. You will see from the treaty that we are about to read that a desire to protect your interests, as well as our own and those of our allies, has influenced our conduct." (They may even have gone so far as to suggest that the diplomatic mission in question was on the subject of piracy.) No mention of Issa of course, but to bring that in might have been felt to be superfluous, an unnecessary complication. One would scarcely have expected them to insist that the ambassador perished in the course of a mission of meddling, even less to make it clear that Issa, having appealed to Rome for help, had in fact gone almost a year without that help. If Polybius had before him Fabius' history and such a report as this of what the Romans said in 228, he may well have felt no need to look further: he will have had the account written by a Roman senator plus a contemporary document. If he had heard something of the Issaian embassy, he perhaps reckoned that the combination of Fabius and the

⁴⁷A. Bauer, *op. cit.* (above, n. 12) 137, 143; followed by P. Bung, *Q. Fabius Pictor* (Diss. Cologne 1950) 184–186, 188–189. The view has not, on the whole, been warmly received (cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1.153), but this is at least partly because both Bauer and Bung were far too schematic in their application of it (cf. text).

document rendered any mention of it unnecessary. After all, the two confirmed one another, and it was in any case the murder of the ambassador, about which there was no question, that had led the Romans to declare war. Indeed, speculation aside, a fully detailed account with thorough discussion of αἰτίαι vs ἀρχαί, and such matters, was not to be expected here, for this is precisely what Polybius had promised not to provide (1.13.6–7):⁴⁸

Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαριθμείσθαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων πράξεων [including the first Illyrian war: 13.4] οὐδὲν οὔθ' ἡμῖν ἀναγκαῖον οὔτε τοῖς ἀκούουσι χρήσιμον, οὐ γὰρ ἱστορεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν προτιθέμεθα, μνησθῆναι δὲ κεφαλαιωδῶς προαιρούμεθα χάριν τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῶν μελλουσῶν ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἱστορεῖσθαι πράξεων.

Yet Polybius did consider the first Illyrian war an important episode in the history of Roman expansion, and it is therefore essential to have a clear notion of what he thought made it worthy of special attention. His statement on this head occurs at 2.2.2:

ἅπερ οὐ παρέργως ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀληθίνως τὴν τε πρόθεσιν τὴν ἡμετέραν συνθεάσασθαι καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν καὶ κατασκευὴν τῆς Ῥωμαίων δυναστείας.

The war thus finds its significance as an illustration of something that was spelled out in an earlier passage (1.63.9):⁴⁹

ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὡς οὐ τύχη Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως, ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν [scil. the first Punic war] ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμήρως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθίκοντο τῆς προθέσεως.

The special importance of the first Illyrian war for Polybius had not to do with its origins, but above all with what it shows about the military capability and effectiveness of the Romans. These qualities are well illustrated by 2.11–12, quite independently of anything that goes before.

It is also possible that some aspects in particular of Fabius' account made it attractive to Polybius. He was likely not averse to its insistence upon the κάλλιστον ἔθος of the Romans, for in another context he attributed much the same thing to them himself (24.10.11–12). There is, moreover, the figure of Teuta, whose shortsightedness seems to be emphasised as a thing to be avoided. In this respect, as much as if not more than in any

⁴⁸On this passage and its importance for Books 1 and 2, see K.-E. Petzold, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung* (Munich 1969) 20–24.

⁴⁹On Polybius' πρόθεσις in this and related passages (including 2.2.2), see especially Petzold, *op. cit.* (above, n. 48) 56 n. 5.

other, she stands in sharp contrast to the Romans.⁵⁰ In yet another way I suspect that Fabius' portrayal of Teuta was very much to Polybius' taste. It was as a result of her unthinking conduct that the Romans entered the war and "these parts of Europe:" the responsibility for what is described as an insane provocation lay entirely with her. Polybius does not enter upon a full discussion of *αἰτίαι* vs *ἀρχαί*, nor, as has been seen, was such to be expected. His statement at 2.2.3, however, is a limited step in this direction: *ἐγνώσαν δὲ διαβαίνειν διὰ τινὰς τοιαύτας αἰτίας*. With 3.6.7 in mind, one must infer from this that the Roman crossing was regarded by Polybius as the *ἀρχή* of the war. What follows, then, contains an account of the factors that led to their decision, that is, the *αἰτίαι*. A precise delineation of these *αἰτίαι* is not promised (cf. *διὰ τινὰς τοιαύτας αἰτίας*), but, whatever they involve, there is no question that Teuta and her actions play a leading rôle among them. On Polybius' account, Teuta is responsible for the war insofar as she and her actions may be seen as factors involved in motivating the Roman decision to send for the first time forces *εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης*.⁵¹

⁵⁰On the subject of the queen, Hammond has recently stated with some plausibility that "the annalists were at pains to show Teuta totally at fault" (*JRS* 1968, 6, n. 22). This applies especially to Florus and Polybius, as well as to Dio, whose fantastic picture of the Illyrian queen is based upon what he found not in Appian but in Polybius. Appian's Teuta does not even enter the story until after the Romans have declared war, and then all she does is to preside over the end of the conflict, maintaining (apparently not unsuccessfully) that Agron, not she, had been at the root of the trouble.

⁵¹The general point involved here is an important one. When wars and their *αἰτίαι* are at issue, Polybius' primary purpose is not to assign blame or responsibility but to explain the various factors that led someone to take a certain action (this action being the *ἀρχή*, the first event of the war in question). Questions about responsibility, if they are to be asked of Polybius, must be answered with reference to his accounts of *αἰτίαι*. That this is the case emerges clearly from his account of the outbreak of the second Punic war. On this occasion alone he specifically poses the question: *τούτων δὲ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, λοιπὸν διευκρινῆσαι καὶ σκέψασθαι περὶ τοῦ κατ' Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον ποτέροις αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀναθετέον* (3.28.5). His decision is taken at 3.30.4–5: if the destruction of Saguntum is reckoned as the *αἰτία*, then it must be admitted that the Carthaginians began the war unjustly; *εἰ δὲ τὴν Σαρδόνος ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὰ συν ταύτῃ χρήματα, πάντως ὁμολογητέον εὐλόγως πεπολεμηκέναι τὸν κατ' Ἀννίβαν πόλεμον τοὺς Καρχηδονίους· καιρῷ γὰρ πεισθέντες ἡμύνοντο σὺν καιρῷ τοὺς βλάψαντας*. On Polybius' account, the fall of Saguntum was an *ἀρχή* of the war (3.6.2–3), but the seizure of Sardinia by the Romans the *μεγίστη αἰτία* (3.10.3–4; note that *πρώτη*, *δευτέρη*, *τρίτη* applied to the *αἰτίαι* serve only to indicate chronological sequence: cf. 3.6.10–11). In the same sense Illyrian actions (and thus Illyrians, especially Teuta) are, on Polybius' account, responsible for the first Illyrian war. I hope soon to discuss this issue at length, particularly in regard to Rome's eastern wars, as it bears directly upon what has been seen as an underlying contradiction in Polybius' account of Rome's eastern expansion (on this contradiction, see F. W. Walbank, *Polybius* [Berkeley 1972] 157–166, esp. 159, 163, and *JRS* 53 [1963] 1–13, esp. 11–12).

CHRONOLOGICAL NOTE

There is disagreement as to the date of Agron's death between Appian and Polybius as he is usually read. The purpose of this note is to suggest another reading of Polybius' chronology. If it is right, then the two authors may be seen to agree with one another, at least as far as concerns the date of Agron's demise.

Polybius places Agron's death after (not too long after but not necessarily immediately after either) the Illyrian success at Medeon and the Aitolian elections mentioned at 2.2.8 and 2.3.1. According to Pol. 4.37.2, Aitolian elections took place right after the autumnal equinox, and this requires that Agron's death be placed sometime round October/November. The next chronological peg, and the first seasonal notice so far, is the beginning of spring 229 (2.9.1). Since a fair amount of military and naval activity took place between these two points, Polybius' narrative is taken to require that they do not fall in successive years. There can, however, be no certain answer to the question of how much time did intervene, for Polybius offers no indication as to when any intervening year(s) began (one had most expected this at 2.4.8–9) or ended. To assume an interval of one year (thus putting Agron's death in latish 231) is the most economical way to take account of the combination of an undated October/November plus spring 229 (so De Sanctis 285 [293] n. 73; cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1. 154, 156).

So far the standard interpretation, which sees a degree of unclarity in Polybius' own chronology. The Aitolian elections are a central part of this view, and one may be a little concerned that they also play a central part in a long anti-Aitolian story. In the latter context it must be recognised that they raise something of a problem. The elections occur at the time of Aitolian siege of Medeon, and it is precisely on election eve and day that the Illyrian force arrives (2.3.1–2). What became of the elections? They were regularly held at Thermon (cf. Walbank, *Commentary* 1. 154), but there is no hint that any or many of the Aitolians left Medeon to go thither and no hint that the Illyrian victory was won over a reduced Aitolian contingent. J. A. O. Larsen has asserted that the Aitolians were ready to dispense with the trip to Thermon and to hold the elections there at Medeon (*TAPA* 83 [1952] 9–10, 30). Federal armies in the field could be specially empowered by a full assembly to make legislative decisions (cf. Pol. 4.7.5 for the Achaians), but there are no indications that elections were treated in this way. Even if the Aitolians were conducting the siege *πανδημει* (Pol. 2.2.7) and even if voter and soldier seem to have been "practically identical" (Larsen, *TAPA* 83.30) in time of war, such practice will have effectively disenfranchised a fair number of people. The

coincidental election serves the story nicely, but it sits there awkwardly from an historical point of view. It may be that it was wrongly imported into this context (this would remove the difficulty about the conduct of the election). Alternatively, it may be that, while belonging to the context, it fell earlier in the year, perhaps at the Panaitolika in the spring: the earliest evidence for the September date (Pol. 4.37.2) refers to 220/219, and one may recall that shortly after that the Achaians moved their elections from May to an autumn date. In either case (i.e., if the elections do not belong or if they do belong but are to be dated to the spring), it would then be possible to take Polybius' own chronology in 2.2–12 at face value, with 2.9.1 indicating the first new spring (229) and 2.12.3 the second (228). The events of 2.2–8 would thus all belong in 230, among them the death of Agron, which could be happily placed in about July of that year, a date which suits Appian's account as well. Cf. above, nn. 6, 7.

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